This mixed-method design aimed to determine how practicing mindfulness in a high school classroom influences students’ academic focus and affective experience. Thirty-nine tenth-grade students participated in an eight-week intervention, in which they practiced mindfulness activities led by their certified English and yoga teacher once per week. Students completed a pre- and posttest Likert-scale survey to measure mindfulness using Greco, Baer, and Smith’s Child and Adolescent Mindfulness Measure (CAMM) as well as three, open-ended post-test reflection questions. The survey data were analyzed (...) to assess change in mindfulness and change in focus, and the qualitative data were analyzed to understand students’ self-perceptions of their affective experience. Results show that students’ scores for both mindfulness and focus increased after the intervention and they also show that students made gains in self-knowledge. The findings provide implications for educators to improve their classroom environments and reduce their own stress. (shrink)

Pretendemos neste artigo analisar a relação entre tragédia antiga e moderna tal qual se apresenta na obra _Ou-Ou_, de Kierkegaard. Assim, analisando o conceito de tragédia na antiguidade e sua mudança na modernidade, afigura-se como problema mostrar de que maneira a reflexão acerca do trágico aponta uma condição para que a arte moderna tenha significado. Levando em conta, então, que a tragédia antiga é caracterizada pela ação no seio do Estado, da família e da religião e que, por outro lado, (...) a tragédia moderna é determinada pela reflexão, procura-se mostrar que o pesar ligado à ação e suas consequências, torna-se angústia ligada à reflexão e à possibilidade de uma vida trágica. Para tal, primeiro analisa-se o conceito de tragédia antiga e moderna de acordo com o exposto por Hegel em seus _Cursos de Estética_, desse modo, pode-se melhor ver de que modo Kierkegaard se apropria do exposto por Hegel, mas também de que maneira diverge deste. Isto feito, será possível ver que enquanto Hegel vê na tragédia uma reconciliação das forças opostas, Kierkegaard acentua o caráter esteticamente ambíguo da mesma, afastando-se de qualquer reconciliação. E que, ao assim fazê-lo, indica que a arte moderna só ganha significado com o renascimento do trágico na modernidade. (shrink)

Este trabalho identifica a realidade da produção do conhecimento stricto sensu em Educação Física de professores que trabalham em cursos de formação no estado da Bahia – 1982 a 2012 –, em vista as determinações históricas e epistemológicas. É parte da pesquisa em rede EPISTEFNORDESTE. Fonte de dados/informações: 142 produções stricto sensu e 5 PNPG. A metodologia tem base dialética. Resultados apontam que os PNPG, alicerçados na lógica do modo de produção capitalista, geram produções que encerram limites lógicos que são (...) entraves para o avanço da área de Educação Física na construção de uma consistente base teórica que responda aos reais problemas que a área vem impondo historicamente. (shrink)

Objetivamos elaborar um balanço sobre lógica das perguntas científicas na produção do conhecimento stricto sensu. Tomamos como fontes 100 dissertações e 32 teses escritas por docentes que trabalham em cursos de Educação Física no Estado da Bahia – 1982 a 2018, abordando enquanto objeto a lógica instituída pelas perguntas científicas na referida produção. Trata-se de uma pesquisa documental, tendo como método o materialismo histórico e dialético. Os resultados apontam que 48% das produções têm suas perguntas de investigação construída a partir (...) da lógica formal; 28% apresenta uma lógica dialética na elaboração das perguntas científicas; e 24% não apresentam problema de investigação. (shrink)

O autor analisa a crítica que fez Wittgenstein aos fundamentos de Matemática na dupla fase do seu pensamento lógico e filosófico. Começa por situá-lo em relação às 3 Escolas que discutiam sobre a fundamentação lógica da matemática: o logicismo, o intuicionismo e o formalismo. Na 1.a fase do Tractatus, vê-se que Wittgenstein é logicista. Mas é original porque não deriva a aritmética do cálculo de classes, como fazia Russell, mas do cálculo proposicional, que generaliza. Considera a matemática como um simples (...) "método lógico". Por isso define o Número como "expoente duma função proposicional"! Mas neste caso trata-se implicitamente, duma nova extensão analógica de princípios e conceitos da aritmética à lógica pura. Por exemplo: noções de número, operação, exponenciação, etc. E se Wittgenstein quer criar, por analogia, números lógicos (símbolos puros), então tem de fazer uma interpretação semântica para passar da lógica formal pura para a aritmética! Só admite o infinito potencial na matemática. Infere-se, pois, que na l.a fase do Tractatus, Wittgenstein, é nominalista e finista. Na 2a fase das Notas (PB ou Remarks) que são manuscritos e fotocópias, (entre 1927 e 1944) Wittgenstein foi variando de pensamento. Agora julga que a matemática se funda a si mesma, como autónoma de lógica pura. Descobre que para além dos "Símbolos" há relações para os "significados" e "usos". E a matemática pode ser teórica e aplicada aos cálculos das ciências. Mas pela sua crítica intuicionista rejeita o valor da teoria dos números irracionais de Dedekind, do teorema e processo da diagonal com que Cantor prova a teoria dos números transfinitos... Wittgenstein aborda ainda os célebres teoremas de Fermat e de Gödel, quando analisa as proposições indecidíveis dos Principia mathematica (de Russell-Whitehead). O autor mostra, no artigo, que Wittgenstein não tem razão na sua crítica pouco profunda ao conceito de número e suas generalizações. .. Na 2.a fase ele continua a ser finitista, mas agora é conceptualista. /// L'auteur analyse la critique que fit Wittgenstein aux fondements des Mathématiques dans la double phase de sa pensée logique et philosophique. Il commence par situer cette pensée en relation avec les trois écoles qui discutaient sur la fondation logique des mathématiques : le logicisme, l'intuitionisme et le formalisme. Dans la première phase du Tractatus, on voit que Wittgenstein est lo-giciste. Mais sa position est originale, parece qu'il ne dérive pas les mathématiques du calcul des classes, comme faisait Russell, mais du calcul propo-sitionnel, qu'il généralise. Il considère les mathématiques comme une simple "méthode logique". C'est pourquoi il définit le Nombre comme "exposant d'une fonction propositionnelle". Mais en ce cas il s'agit implicitement d'une nouvelle extension analogique de principes et de concepts de l'arithmétique à la logique pure. Par exemple : les notions de nombre, d'opération, d'opération exponentionelle etc. Et si Wittgenstein veut créer, par analogie, des nombres logiques (symboles pures), il doit alors faire une interprétation sémantique pour passer de la logique formelle pure aux mathématiques! Il n'admet que l'infini potentiel en mathématiques. Il s'ensuit alors que dans la première phase du Tractatus Wittgenstein est nominaliste et finitiste. Dans la seconde phase des Notes Philosophische Bemerkungen ou Remarks1 qui sont des manuscrits et photocopies (entre 1927 et 1944), Wittgenstein diversifia sa pensée. Il pense alors que les mathématiques se fondent elles-mêmes, de façon autonome par rapport à la logique pure. Il découvre que au-delà des "Symboles" il y a des relations pour les "sens" et les "usages". Et les mathématiques peuvent être théoriques et appliquées aux calculs des sciences. Mais par sa critique intutiuniste, il rejette la valeur de la théorie des nombres irrationnels de Dedekind, du théorème et du procédé de la diagonale par lesquels Cantor prouve la théorie des nombres transfinis. Wittgenstein aborde encore les célèbres théorèmes de Fermât et de Gô-del quand il analyse les propositions indécidables des Principia Mathematica (de Russell – Whitehead). L'auteur montre dans l'article que Wittgenstein n'a pas raison dans sa critique peu profonde au concept de nombre et ses généralisations... Dans la seconde phase, il continue à être finitiste, mais à présent il est conceptualiste. /// The author examines Wittgenstein's criticism of the foundations of mathematics in the two phases of his logical and philosophical thought. He begins by situating it in relation to the three schools which discussed the logical foundations of mathematics: logicism, intuicionism, and formalism. In the first phase of the Tractatus, we can see Wittgenstein as a logicist. His originality resides in his not deriving arithmetic from the calculus of classes, as did Russell, but from propositional calculus that he generalizes. Wittgenstein considers mathemathics as a simple "logical method". This is why he defines "number" as a "exponent of a propositional function". But in this case it is implicitly a matter of a new analogical extension of arithmetical principles and concepts to pure logic. For example, the notions of number, operation, and exponentiation, etc And if Wittgensteinwishes to create by analogy logical numbers (pure symbols), then he has to effectuate a semantical interpretation to pass from pure formal logic to arithmetic! He only allows potencial infinity in mathematics. One can infer that in the Tractatus phase, Wittgenstein is nominalist and finitist. In the second phase of Remarks, manuscripts and copies, dating between 1927 and 1944, Wittgenstein changed his thinking. Now he believes that mathematics founds itself independently of pure logic. He discovers beyond "symbols" there are relations for "meanings" and "uses". And mathematics can be theoretical and applicable to the calculus of sciences. But by his intuitional criticism he can reject the value of the theory of irracional numbers of Dedekind, of the theorem and the process of the diagonal, with wich Cantor proves the theory of transfinit numbers... Wittgenstein refers still the famous theorems of Fermat and Godel when he examines the indecidable propositions of the Prinvipia Mathemativa (of Russell-Whitehead). In this article the author shows that Wittgenstein is not correct in his not too profound criticism of the concept of numbers and its generalizations. In the second phase, he continues to be finitist but now also conceptualist. (shrink)

Face à la nouvelle sensibilité de l'homme contemporain envers les questions écologiques, à l’importance qu’il accorde au soin de la planète, et dans le sillage de la publication de Laudato Si’, la vision de Teilhard de Chardin apparaît à nouveau actuelle. Bien que les questions et l’état des sciences aient changé considérablement depuis sa mort en 1955, la portée cosmologique de la christologie teilhardienne fait de la perspective du jésuite paléontologue une source inespérée pour une pratique chrétienne adaptée aux exigences (...) du monde moderne. À partir de sa notion d’Église en tant que Corps cosmique du Christ, où toutes les créatures de notre vaste univers sont englobées au sein de la sphère ecclésiale elle-même, la communion entre les êtres s’étend au-delà des êtres humains, fondant un profond respect pour toutes les créatures. Le présent ouvrage cherche à préciser et à justifier, d’un côté, l’insertion de Teilhard au sein de la tradition chrétienne et à envisager, d’un autre, les conséquences pratiques de cette ecclésiologie écologique, notamment dans la spiritualité, l’éthique et la liturgie. Andreas Gonçalves Lind est un prêtre jésuite luso-allemand qui, pour le moment, fait une thèse doctorale sur la phénoménologie henryenne de la Vie à l’Université de Namur comme boursier de la FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Portugal). (shrink)

Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...) second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary. (shrink)

Th e simple proposal about rigidity for predicates can be stated thus: a predicate is rigid if its canonical nominalization signifi es the same property across the different possible worlds. I have tried elsewhere to defend such a proposal from the trivialization problem, according to which any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be rigid. Benjamin Schnieder (2005) aims fi rst to rebut my argument that some canonical nominalizations can be fl exible, then to provide fi ve arguments to the (...) eff ect that they are all rigid, and fi nally to propose a general explanation of why they are all rigid. I show fi rst why my argument has not been rebutted, then why Schnieder’s fi ve arguments for their rigidity all fail, and fi nally why the alleged “explanation” cannot be such, as the facts alluded to are neutral with respect to the rigidity or fl exibility of the nominalizations. (shrink)

Kilimanjaro is a paradigmatic mountain, if any is. Consider atom Sparky, which is neither determinately part of Kilimanjaro nor determinately not part of it. Let Kilimanjaro(+) be the body of land constituted, in the way mountains are constituted by their constituent atoms, by the atoms that make up Kilimanjaro together with Sparky, and Kilimanjaro(–) the one constituted by those other than Sparky. On the one hand, there seems to be just one mountain in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro. On the other (...) hand, both Kilimanjaro(+) and Kilimanjaro(–)—and indeed many other similar things—seem to have an equal claim to be a mountain: all of them exhibit the grounds for something being a mountain—like being an elevation of the earth’s surface rising abruptly and to a large height from the surrounding level,1 or whathaveyou—; and there seems to be nothing in the vicinity with a better claim. Hence, the problem of the many. (shrink)

There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of (...) the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected. (shrink)

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...) similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence plays an important role and has been used by several countries as a health strategy in an attempt to understand, control and find a cure for the disease caused by Coronavirus. These intelligent systems can assist in accelerating the process of developing antivirals for Coronavirus and in predicting new variants of this virus. For this reason, much research on COVID-19 has been developed with the aim of contributing to new discoveries about the Coronavirus. However, there are some epistemological (...) aspects about the use of AI in this pandemic period of Covid-19 that deserve to be discussed and need reflections. In this scenario, this article presents a reflection on the two epistemological aspects faced by the COVID-19 pandemic: The epistemological aspect resulting from the use of patient data to fill the knowledge base of intelligent systems; the epistemological problem arising from the dependence of health professionals on the results/diagnoses issued by intelligent systems. In addition, we present some epistemological challenges to be implemented in a pandemic period. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates (...) is then defended, by exploiting corresponding intuitions concerning statements involving their nominalizations, in an analogous manner. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

Rádios comunitárias podem ser um dos caminhos para o debate acerca de uma democratização da comunicação no Brasil. Elas discutem sobre os direitos e deveres da população e são ferramentas na luta para conquistá-los. Isso justifica a espera de nove anos de uma emissora de rádio comunitária maranhense, a Arca FM, de Açailândia, para conseguir ir ao ar legalizada, processo que se estendeu de abril de 1998 a junho de 2007. Abordam-se o longo processo de resistência e a espera pela (...) outorga através das memórias e depoimentos de quem participou da trajetória da Rádio Arca, uma emissora que nasceu para denunciar e combater o aliciamento ao tráfico humano e o trabalho escravo no Maranhão. A entrevista em profundidade foi a principal estratégia metodológica seguida para buscar respostas na experiência subjetiva dos sujeitos envolvidos. (shrink)

Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...) case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention. (shrink)

According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as (...) 'is a knife,' 'is a bachelor,' or 'is funny.' In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role, and that the contention that "unnatural" properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded. (shrink)

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith, “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities (...) and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

A etnia Tabajara da Paraíba está passando por um processo de etnogênese e luta para a sua autoafirmação e reconhecimento como povo indígena, bem como lutam pela retomada das suas terras que foram retiradas pelo processo de colonização e devido a ambição dos grandes proprietários de terras. Nesse processo, surge a profecia Tabajara, que traz um avivamento da sua espiritualidade, cultura e ritualística, reagrupando assim, um povo que estava espalhado e afastado das suas origens. O ritual do Toré ganha grande (...) importância, tornando-se imprescindível para os indígenas. O presente trabalho tem como base os autores Eliane Farias e Lusival Barcellos, pesquisadores das etnias indígenas paraibanas. Como objetivo da pesquisa, foi realizada uma breve análise da ritualística Tabajara, entre ela, o ritual do Toré, tendo como base a pesquisa bibliográfica. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo discutir os principais resultados apresentados pelas pesquisas “Relações étnico-raciais e de gênero no contexto das práticas pedagógicas: escrevivências e invenções na educação básica” e a pesquisa “Ensino de História e Cultura Afro-brasileira, Africana e Identidade: desafios e implicações nas Práticas pedagógicas”[1]. Dialogamos com os métodos adotados nas pesquisas, a etnoescrevivência e a pesquisa ação colaborativa, tomando os Ateliês de Pesquisa como dispositivo de construção de dados e intervenção, que possibilitou a construção de um movimento formativo (...) e coautoral, pautado na colaboração e na reflexão sobre a prática. As discussões teóricas dialogam principalmente com hooks ; Lima ; Pimenta ; Silva e Costa e outros/as autores/as. Os resultados apontaram que ao tomar como centralidade as narrativas da experiência docente e suas histórias de vida no entrelace do desenvolvimento profissional, os APs provocaram deslocamentos nos processos formativos com os temas raça e gênero, produzindo reflexão e alteração nas práticas pedagógicas. Demonstraram ainda, que não basta ser colaborador da pesquisa para que a cocriação e coautoria se estabeleçam, é fundamental que o ethos da confiança, a relação ética e horizontal seja construída ao longo do processo, haja vista que o modus operandi dos Ateliês de Pesquisa prima pela horizontalidade, invenção e experiência ancoradas no real do cotidiano escolar como propulsoras da produção do conhecimento pedagógico considerado como conhecimento científico do campo da docência. (shrink)

The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...) contrary views are critically discussed in the paper. (shrink)

The author defends the naturalizing program of the notion of representation against the primitivist view according to which the notion of representation as belonging to psychology as a mature science is irreducible. First, the author concedes that the original teleological project trivializes the concept of representation by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, amoeba, when the best available explanation is the assumption that primitive organisms and artifacts are merely indicating proximal stimulation rather than representing the distal causes of stimulation. Yet, the (...) author does not believe that this presents an unsurmountable obstacle for the naturalizing program when what is in question is genuine sensory representation, namely perception. In the author’s view, what matters for the naturalizing program are not cases in which the concept of representation is misemployed, but rather cases in which the focus is genuine sensory representation, that is, genuine perceptions; or so he shall argue. (shrink)

Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.

Critical notica (in Spanish) of *Relativism and Monadic Truth* (OUP 2009), by Cappelen and Hawthorne.

RESUMO Este artigo apresenta e discute acontecimentos que emergiram no decorrer de uma pesquisa-intervenção com jovens, visando problematizar as contribuições para a formação ética, estética e política tanto dos pesquisadores como dos participantes. Oficinas estéticas mediadas por linguagens artístico-visuais consistiram no modus operandi da pesquisa-intervenção, sendo os acontecimentos relativos à oficina de graffiti o foco das análises aqui apresentadas. Participaram dessa oficina entre 20 a 25 jovens matriculados em uma escola pública municipal de Florianópolis/SC, com idades entre 13 e 16 (...) anos. As atividades foram coordenadas por bolsistas de IC e extensão, graduandos de psicologia, e um bolsista AT, grafiteiro. Os registros das atividades foram feitos via filmagens, fotografia e registros em diário de campo. As análises foram realizadas a partir de uma perspectiva dialógica, com foco na responsividade que conota as ações e pauta a condição alteritária da existência.ABSTRACT This paper presents and discusses events that emerged in the course of research involving an intervention conducted with youngsters. The objective was to discuss contributions to ethical, aesthetic and political formation of both the researchers and participants. Aesthetic workshops mediated by artistic-visual languages consisted of the modus operandi of the intervention research, and the events related to a graffiti workshop were the focus of this analysis. From 20 to 25 youngsters, aged between 13 to 16 years old and enrolled in a city public school in Florianópolis, SC, Brazil participated. The activities were coordinated by undergraduate research assistants, senior psychology students, and one graffiti artist who received a Technical Support scholarship. The activities were filmed, photographed and recorded in a field diary. The analyses were conducted from a dialogic perspective focusing on responsiveness that connotes the actions and grounds the otherness nature of existence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...) sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. (shrink)

Neste artigo, no intuito de nos inscrevermos em uma reflexão mais abrangente acerca dos negacionismos contemporâneos, com foco no “negacionismo histórico”, que se sustenta por processos de falseamento e homogeneização da história e das memórias, buscamos seguir o seguinte roteiro de reflexão analítica: i) tratar da escrita da história, abordando a produção de memórias, as políticas de esquecimento e o falseamento discursivo da história; ii) traçar um panorama acerca da escrita da história e da produção de memórias da ditadura civil-militar (...) brasileira, observando, de um lado, a produção discursiva nos campos escolar, jornalístico e “de história”, como formas de manifestação e promoção da memória oficial do regime, e, de outro, a construção das políticas institucionais de memória, com foco nas comissões de verdade, como mecanismos de instituição de regimes de dizibilidade sustentados por memórias-outras; iii) como eixo analítico-conclusivo, traçar uma reflexão que vai da negação da história à formação do autoritarismo contemporâneo, tomando como exemplo a violência contra os povos originários. Inscrevemo-nos, para dar cabo a esta discussão, na perspectiva arqueogenealógica dos Estudos Discursivos Foucaultianos, a partir da mobilização de um arcabouço teórico-metodológico que permite a análise dos processos de formação dos enunciados e dos discursos e, fundamentalmente, uma crítica reflexiva do presente. (shrink)

According to relativism, these appearances of faultless disagreement are to be endorsed. According to moderate relativism, this can be done within the general Kaplan-Lewis-Stalnaker two-dimensional framework, in which the basic semantic notion is that of a sentence s being true at a context c at the index i: it may in effect be the case that s is true at c but false at c∗. According to indexical relativism, this is so in virtue of the content of sentence s at (...) c being different from that of s at c∗. (shrink)

O presente artigo procura esclarecer os traços fundamentais da relação entre o pensamento de Heidegger e a política. No contexto da emergência do nazismo na Alemanha, Heidegger recusará a compreensão do povo como “raça” e como “valor supremo”. Nesta linha, apropriando-se da concepção de Ernst Jünger do “trabalhador”, procurará pensar a relação deste trabalhador com um mundo, ou seja, a “mobilização total” do mundo por uma “vontade de poder”, para lá daquilo a que chama a “metafísica da subjectividade”, à qual (...) o próprio Jünger permanecerá amarado. Por outro lado, confrontando-se com o conceito do político de Carl Schmitt, Heidegger procurará aceitar o desafio de pensar este mesmo político como algo irredutível ao estatal. No entanto, se, em Schmitt, a tentativa de pensar o político como algo anterior ao Estado o conduzia a pensá-lo a partir da diferenciação amigo-inimigo, e a defender esta diferenciação como algo que deveria ser monopolizada pelo Estado, Heidegger procurava pensar o político fora da relação amigo-inimigo e, neste sentido, como uma instância que destituiria o Estado de um estatuto de “valor supremo”. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues against attempts to preserve the entailment principle (or a restriction of it) while avoiding the explosion of truthmakers for necessities and truthmaker triviality. In doing so, he both defends the disjunction thesis--if something makes true a disjunctive truth, then it makes true one of its disjuncts--, and rejects the conjunction thesis--if something makes tue a conjunctive truth, then it makes true each of its conjuncts. In my discussion, I provide plausible counterexamples to the disjunction thesis, and (...) contend that Rodriguez-Pereyra's general defence of it fails. Then I defend the conjunction thesis from Rodriguez-Pereyra's case against it. (shrink)

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...) As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

Upon her release, Mary gains new knowledge aligned with B-type materialism and property dualism, even though she already possesses knowledge of all the facts and truths related to color and color vision during her time in captivity. I argue that this “cognitive progress” can only be accounted for by the acquisition of a new nonconceptual representation of the color red upon her release. Independently of any concepts, this acquisition already enables her to discriminate all sorts of shades of color within (...) her environment. However, the existence of nonconceptual representations, by itself, is not enough to specify the type of knowledge Mary acquired, obviously. We must add two additional conditions. Firstly, the acquisition of these nonconceptual representations must enrich Mary’s preexisting physical concept of red. Assuming that concepts are mental files, the enrichment takes the form of housing information in analog format, like pictures of the color red. Secondly, by utilizing these enhanced concepts by analog information, Mary can achieve an introspective propositional knowledge. She learns the truth of the crucial proposition: she learns what it is like to experience red. (shrink)

Tyler Burge (2010) provided a scathing critique of all programs for naturalizing concepts of representation, especially teleological naturalizing programs. He tended to demonstrate that “representational content” is a concept that cannot be reduced to more fundamental biological or physical ideas. According to him, since the 1970s, the concept of representational content has been firmly established in cognitive psychology as a mature science and utilized inadequate explanations. Since Dretske’s program is Burge’s primary objective, this paper concentrates on Dretske’s perspective. Following Burge’s (...) criticisms, I concur that Dretske’s naturalizing program trivializes the complex concept of representational content in cognitive science by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, etc. There is a superior explanation, namely Burge’s alternative idea of “registering information.” I do not believe, however, that this spells the end of naturalization programs. There is no reason to deny that at least some biological functions entail representational capacities with perceptual constancy, if not all. Cases of genuine perception, representing the accurate distal causes of proximal stimuli under various conditions, contribute to fitness. It is not by accident that representational content plays a role in cases of genuine perception. Consequently, I will argue that accuracy and biological fitness cannot be separated. (shrink)

RESUMO O pensamento iluminista defendia que a ciência e as artes proporcionaram o desenvolvimento da razão e a melhoria dos costumes. A posição contrária, tomada pelo filósofo Jean-Jacques Rousseau, rendeu-lhe o prêmio da Academia de Dijon e o fez, depois da publicação de outras obras, um defensor da natureza e do homem natural. Diante da depravação dos costumes, o autor promove a própria cultura como remédio, haja vista que não se pode voltar ao estado de natureza. O conjunto de sua (...) obra pode, dessa forma, ser considerado como uma tentativa audaciosa de Rousseau em utilizar-se das belas letras como um remédio contra os males da civilização, principalmente o afastamento do homem para com a natureza. ABSTRACT The Enlightenment philosophers argued that science and the arts provided the development and improvement of the customs. The contrary position taken by Jean-Jacques Rousseau produced a great impact so that he received the Dijon Academy Award and was made - after the publication of other works - a defender of nature and of the natural man. Considering the depravity of manners, the author promotes the culture itself as a remedy, as no one can return to the state of nature. All his writings together can, thus, be seen as a bold attempt to use up the arts as a remedy against the evil of civilization, mainly the withdrawal of man from nature. (shrink)